Iran strikes: are we keeping track of potential pollution of water?

In a conflict zone, few things are as devastating as a high-yield airstrike.

But when a bunker buster detonates near or within a watershed, as happened recently in Iran, the environmental damage can ripple far beyond the blast radius.

While headlines have focused on geopolitics and nuclear escalation, environmental monitoring professionals face a different set of urgent questions…

What has entered the watercourse? What systems are in place to detect it? 

And how long until that pollution reaches people?

If you're looking to monitor the environment for radiation, take a look at our international directory of companies supplying radiation detection systems. 

Bunker busters and uranium chemistry

The June 2025 U.S. and Israeli strikes on Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan targeted underground uranium enrichment facilities, complexes built to withstand conventional bombing. 

These sites weren’t nuclear reactors but they stored and processed materials like uranium hexafluoride (UF₆), which is both chemically hazardous and mildly radioactive.

When UF₆ is released, whether from a ruptured cylinder or damaged centrifuge, it reacts rapidly with air moisture to produce hydrofluoric acid (HF) and uranyl fluoride (UO₂F₂). 

Both are highly toxic. HF is a corrosive gas that can damage lung tissue and acidify soil and water. 

UO₂F₂ is soluble in water and can contaminate groundwater or surface supplies with chemically toxic uranium.

Because these facilities were deep underground, the risk of airborne radioactive fallout was relatively low. 

Instead, the greatest environmental concern is the gradual infiltration of uranium and fluorides into local water systems.

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Site-by-site summary

Fordow (Qom Province)

At Fordow, the U.S. used GBU-57 bunker busters to collapse tunnels built under more than 80 meters of rock. 

Iranian authorities had reportedly evacuated much of the UF₆ and enriched uranium beforehand. No external radiation spike was detected.

However, Fordow sits above fractured karst geology feeding regional aquifers. 

If uranium-bearing dust or HF residue escaped into surrounding rock or soil, contamination could slowly leach into groundwater. 

While no contamination has yet been reported, wells and springs near Qom will require ongoing testing.

Natanz (Isfahan Province)

The Natanz complex was struck first by Israeli missiles, then by U.S. bunker busters. 

According to the IAEA, the centrifuge halls were likely destroyed. UF₆ cylinders and process lines may have ruptured during the attack.

No off-site radiation was detected but IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi confirmed possible radiological and chemical contamination within the site. 

The concern now is rain washing uranium particles or HF residues into surrounding farmland or seasonal watercourses.

Local wells and surface channels in the Natanz-Kashan region should be tested for uranium, fluoride, pH, and conductivity shifts, especially after rainfall events.

Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center

Isfahan’s Uranium Conversion Facility was hit by more than two dozen cruise missiles. This site stored hundreds of tons of UF₆ and large quantities of industrial fluorine compounds. 

Four buildings were destroyed, including the UF₆ production facility.

Although no radiological release has been detected in Isfahan city, the site’s proximity to urban areas and the Zayandeh River raises red flags. 

HF vapours may have dispersed into the air and subsequent acid fallout could affect urban soil and water supplies. 

Short-term and long-term sampling of water sources and agricultural soils is essential.

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Monitoring blind spots in conflict

Early government and IAEA statements confirm no acute radiological release. But that doesn’t mean the environment is safe. 

The most serious contamination risks from this type of incident are chemical and hydrological, not easily detected by gamma sensors alone.

Unfortunately, most environmental monitoring networks are not designed to function through warfare. Conflict introduces several blind spots:

• Instrumentation loss: bombings can knock out sensors and telemetry.
• Personnel evacuation: inspectors and responders are often pulled out.
• Restricted access: security or political concerns limit site entry.
• Data opacity: Warring governments may suppress or delay findings.

In Iran’s case, environmental professionals have very limited real-time insight. Radiation monitors are working—but do not detect uranium in water. Everything from chemical sensors to soil samplers is needed to assess long-term impacts.

What should be monitored?

A comprehensive post-strike environmental response should include:

• Water quality baselines: pH, turbidity, fluoride, conductivity.
• Radiological testing: Uranium concentration (total and isotopic) in groundwater and surface water.
• Chemical residues: HF presence, changes in water acidity, fluorine concentrations.
• Soil contamination: Uranium and fluoride in surface and subsurface soils.
• Air dispersion residues: Acid deposition monitoring where plumes passed.

Groundwater monitoring is particularly vital in Fordow and Natanz, where rural communities depend on wells that may be vulnerable to delayed contamination.

Crisis-proof monitoring infrastructure

In light of these events, several technical and policy interventions should be prioritised:

• Deploy mobile field labs near affected sites to run basic radiochemical and chemical tests rapidly and independently.
• Install passive groundwater sensors downstream of affected zones, equipped to log conductivity and fluoride levels continuously.
• Pre-install autonomous multi-parameter sondes in at-risk watersheds to provide persistent data, even in conflict.
• Integrate monitoring access into ceasefire frameworks; environmental assessment must not wait until a conflict ends.
• Build redundancy into monitoring systems, including satellite remote sensing (for plume analysis, heat anomalies) and international baseline data-sharing.

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Why this matters

The bunker buster strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure may not have caused a Chernobyl-style event but they demonstrate just how easily chemical and radioactive hazards can intersect with hydrology.

A few hundred grams of uranium leaching into groundwater may not trigger alarms but it can quietly contaminate a community’s well for years. 

A burst of HF may not leave visible damage but it can threaten human health if absorbed into water supplies.

Environmental monitoring professionals are often the first to spot these signals, and the last to be consulted during conflict. That must change.

Water does not respect blast zones or borders. The damage from these strikes may be buried underground but if toxic residues escape into aquifers or streams, the fallout will not stay contained.